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Introduction 
 
Catholic Social Teaching (CST), which frames morality in terms of 
promoting the common good, offers moral guidance on a wide range of 
issues. One such issue is development in the global economy. By its own 
account, the World Bank plays an important role in facilitating global 
economic development for the global good (About Us, 2007). As such, CST 
provides a lens through which one can evaluate both the morality and 
effectiveness of World Bank lending practices. After evaluating the 
empirical results of World Bank lending to Latin American countries during 
the 1990s by the standards established by CST, this essay argues that World 
Bank lending practices are immoral. Additionally, it is argued that sound 
economic policies are actually congruent with a moral approach to World 
Bank lending. In addition, I argue that CST offers an opportunity to bring 
about both human flourishing and sound economic policy for the benefit of 
the entire global community. 
    
The Globalization Debate 
There is much debate in the public arena about whether or not 
globalization is a beneficial phenomenon, particularly for emerging 
economies. The scope of the phenomenon called globalization makes it 
difficult to assess outcomes from either subjective or empirical points of 
view with precision. Many current arguments in the globalization debate 
would at least acknowledge that globalization has the potential to impact the 
global community in very positive ways. One such piece of research is the 
socioeconomic matrix reporting on 1997 outcomes of globalization among 
poor nations (World Bank as cited in Wolf 143). After controlling for 
population differences, the results suggest that more globalized countries 
were better developed then their less globalized counterparts, based on 
indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), growth rate per capita, 
Stefan Perun 
primary education, and rule of law. Additionally, some rise in the overall life 
expectancy and a reduction in global malnourishment has been an effect of 
globalization (Singer 85-87). The enormous potential benefit of 
globalization to universally increase the standard of living seems to 
outweigh the costs. Based on the empirical evidence of improved economic 
conditions throughout the world, particularly in countries like China and 
India, it seems possible for countries to “take advantage of globalization, 
without being taken advantage of by globalization” (Stiglitz 23-43).  
However, many of these same arguments are also critical of the ways in 
which developed countries exercise an upper hand in deciding the terms of 
globalization, particularly in negotiating multinational trade arrangements. 
In addition, some argue more generally that globalization exploits workers in 
poorer countries, while richer countries capitalize on the resulting human 
suffering (Daly as cited in Gehring 73-80). At the heart of such arguments is 
the critique that wealthy countries continue to repress the exploited countries 
in order to maintain a favorable power balance. Rather than engage in 
dichotomous debate—i.e., one that seeks to defend a strictly pro- or anti-
globalization stance—a more meaningful approach is to assess globalization 
based on its effects in the global community. 
How is one to discern the impact of policies of nation-states, international 
trade organizations, international courts of law, and treaties between 
countries that facilitate globalization? I argue that evaluating empirical 
evidence resulting from previous multilateral loan arrangements through the 
World Bank is one place to start. The numbers and outcomes of loans made 
to Latin American countries during the early 1990s and the regions’ 0% 
GDP that ensued provides compelling evidence about the effects of World 
Bank lending policies in practice. In this case, the risk of development fell 
on the shoulders of the region, and currency fluctuations resulted in an 
enormous, unpayable debt burden that stifled Latin America’s economic 
growth. While western banks were bailed out of this crisis, Latin American 
countries were left to sort out the resulting defaults (Stiglitz 211-244).  
Unfortunately, the case of Latin America (evaluated in detail below) is 
not the exception. Eastern Europe’s poverty grew ten-fold in the years after 
the fall of communism as World Bank policies acted to “ease” the transition 
to capitalism (Stiglitz 39). In another example, debt from World Bank 
lending, coupled with poor regulatory oversight, doubled Africa’s poverty 
over the last twenty years, while Western investors have extracted many of 
the region’s abundant natural resources (Stiglitz 41). The empirical evidence 
speaks for itself. As this essay will explore, the structure of World Bank 
lending practices are economically and morally amiss. Certainly there must 
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be some moral obligation for the wealthy nations to not only enjoy the 
economic and material rewards of growth in developing countries, but also 
to bear some risk associated with their development. 
 
Catholic Social Teaching 
 
There are many tools one could use to evaluate World Bank lending 
practices. For instance, one might rely solely on rationality, a certain 
religious tradition, a particular philosophy of ethics, or even popular opinion. 
It seems most reasonable to use a tool that combines elements of each. CST 
draws on a rich intellectual tradition, the experience of the Catholic Church, 
and standing traditions. More specifically, using CST offers a rich tradition 
informed by centuries of the Catholic Church’s work toward “humanization” 
(Verstraeten as cited in Coleman & Ryan 28). Utilizing a dogma from one 
religious tradition may be perceived as problematic. However, CST offers, 
particularly through papal encyclicals, ideals of moral responsibility that are 
relevant to understanding the moral responsibility of richer nations to poorer 
ones. 
Despite its complexity, the basic theme of CST is the promotion of the 
common good. The “common good” refers to the ability of all in a 
community to have the necessary conditions to “perfect their humanity,” or 
conditions that provide for “human flourishing” (Land 64; Rowntree 596). 
The common good from a CST perspective is nuanced. It could be argued 
that at its roots lies Aristotle’s idea of law-abidingness, or the collective of 
all virtues necessary for a moral life (Novak 69). Aristotle referred to this as 
legal justice. Aquinas, who saw law-abidingness as a “general justice,” or 
social justice, believed that this was a virtue in and of itself, thereby 
advancing Aristotle’s idea of legal justice. Aquinas reasoned that it was the 
common good that supported the good of individuals (Novak 70; Land 65). 
Accordingly, drawing on the Biblical tradition, CST has a strong bias in 
favor of the poor (Coleman & Ryan 17). As such, the common good does 
not favor one or a few privileged groups (Land 65-66).  
Modern CST has it roots in the encyclical tradition founded in 1891 by 
Pope Leo XIII (Coleman & Ryan 15; McCann 57). The first papal 
encyclical, Rerum Novarum, contained guidance on international trade and 
affirmed the natural right to private property. In 1991, Pope John Paul II 
issued Centesimus Annus (CA) celebrating one-hundred years since the first 
papal encyclical. In it the Pope writes, “…the free market is the most 
efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effectively responding to 
needs” (CA 34). More importantly, CA explains that there are many people 
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who are not able to participate in the free market because of inequality 
between countries, and thus stronger nations have a moral responsibility 
“…to provide all individuals and nations with the basic conditions which 
will enable them to share in development” (CA 35).  
This idea of “distributive justice” as a morally binding principle supports 
the common good by asserting that God’s intention for every human is to be 
given the conditions to flourish (Rowntree 598; Colman & Ryan 17-18). 
Advancing the idea further, the encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS) 
defines this moral binding to distributive justice as a virtue, as solidarity. 
Solidarity as a “virtue” calls for developed countries to fully acknowledge 
their relationship of interdependence with developing ones, and also asserts 
that developed countries have a moral responsibility to enable developing 
countries to share in the benefits of development (SRS 38). SRS suggests 
that this solidarity “demands… sacrifices necessary for the good of the 
whole world community” (SRS 45). These sacrifices in solidarity are what 
Coleman and Ryan would refer to as the “fair allocation of burdens and 
benefits in society, [which] guarantees [that] parties… have relatively equal 
weight as moral agents” (Coleman & Ryan 17). 
An evaluation of lending practices, analyzed through the lens of CST’s 
concept of the common good in general and of distributive justice in 
particular, would dictate that the World Bank lending practices must seek the 
common good through relatively equal sharing of burdens as well as 
benefits among bargaining parties. The members of the World Bank have a 
moral duty, according to CST, to share risk associated with development 
lending. 
World Bank 
The World Bank was founded in 1944 in New England for the purpose of 
post-World War II reconstruction. In recent decades, the World Bank has 
shifted its mission to “…global poverty reduction and improve[ment] of 
living standards…” (About Us 2007). The World Bank is comprised of five 
separate institutions. They are the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International 
Development Association (IDA). The primary two development institutions 
are the IBRD and the IDA. 
The IBRD works solely with middle-income countries (MICs). These 
countries account for a little under half of the world’s population and 
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represent 70% of people living on less then two dollars per day (Projects & 
Operations 2007). According to the World Bank, the IBRD seeks to meet the 
unique needs of MICs by raising capital in the world markets and making 
loans with favorable terms. The World Bank states that MICs are important 
in the global community because of their ability (or inability) to “provide 
global public goods such as clean energy, trade integration, environmental 
protection, international financial stability, and the fight against 
communicable diseases” (Projects & Operations 2007). 
As such, the work of the IBRD is to provide needed financing for 
infrastructure and other societal needs, such as education and healthcare 
(Projects & Operations 2007). The World Bank claims that the IBRD plays 
an important role in developing MICs because favorable loan terms facilitate 
access to capital. Without this developmental institution, MICs would be 
forced to borrow on world markets, which are subject to various credit-
worthiness requirements, fluctuations in repayment terms, and interest rates. 
Based on various political, economic, and market conditions, MICs may not 
otherwise have access to needed funding. 
The other major development institution of the World Bank, the IDA, 
stands in contrast to the IBRD by focusing on the world’s poorest countries. 
These countries are defined as those with a Gross National Income (GNI) 
per capita of $1,065 or less per year (IDA 2007). Primary concerns in these 
countries are access to clean water, basic healthcare, and basic education. 
Funding makes its way to these destitute countries through grants or interest-
free loans, called credits. The repayment terms of these loans are often 
spread over thirty-five or forty years with an initial ten-year grace period 
(IDA 2007). The money used in these societal investment projects comes 
from donor nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
Germany, France, Sweden, Italy and Canada. These and other countries 
contributed $33 billion in 2005 to the IDA (for a complete list of donors and 
amounts, see Contributions to the 14th Replenishment 2007). 
IBRD Lending Practices: An Empirical Look 
The essential practice of the IBRD is to raise capital in the world markets 
and to make loans to MICs for the purpose of funding public goods 
including infrastructure, energy, education, and healthcare. These public 
goods allow the borrowing nation to better participate in the global economy 
by providing the basic conditions necessary to produce goods and to trade 
with other nations. Monies used to build roads and the like are supposed to 
provide necessary conditions to expand GDP growth, primarily through an 
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increase in exported commodities, goods, and to a lesser extent, services. It 
would not be reasonable to expect lending outcomes to always be ideal or 
the aims to be achieved perfectly. It is true that IBRD lending has the 
potential to successfully provide the necessary infrastructure to participate in 
the global economy (Wolf xii-xv). However, IBRD loans can also frustrate 
development. This is particularly true when loans by the World Bank are 
lent in dollar or euro denominations. 
Countries who are major “donors” to the World Bank also set the policies 
for lending programs. From 1984 to 1993, debt service payments from Latin 
American countries to developed lending nations totaled $116 billion in net 
outflows, resulting in a dismal annual economic growth of less than one 
percent (Arista 30). Known as the “lost decade,” the effects of this ten-year 
period on the world economy prompted a closer look at international lending 
policies (Arista 27). Policy makers from the World Bank, along with 
representatives from ten Latin American countries, met in Washington, 
D.C., to develop policies that would provide sustainable capital inflows for 
development. The so-called Washington Consensus was structured to ease 
capital flow restrictions with the idea that rapid privatization was the best 
way to facilitate development (Stiglitz 17). Unfortunately, the adoption of 
the Washington Consensus policies did not result in mass inflows of capital 
from private investors into the region. Instead, it exposed Latin American 
countries to volatility in global capital markets.  
One such example of exposure occurred during the East Asia crisis in 
1997, when investors panicked to extract capital out of the region due to 
potentially threatening currency fluctuations (Stiglitz 34). The capital 
contraction in East Asia forced interest rates to rise throughout the global 
economy. Argentina’s exposure to dollar-denominated debt payments in the 
context of rising interest rates increased their debt payments by almost 50% 
(Stiglitz 221). This happened to coincide with favorable shorter-term lending 
practices, which encouraged Latin American countries to borrow, effectively 
restructuring their external debt obligations (Arista 26). The favorable 
lending terms resulted in Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO), lead by 
the World Bank, to make loans accounting for 81% of the region’s net 
capital inflows (Arista 26). Unlike the other 19% of inflows from foreign 
direct investment (FDI), these loans issued by public sector creditors placed 
the bulk of the development risk on the borrower. Moreover, since the 
collective debt restructuring across Latin American countries was mainly 
conducted in short-term instruments, outstanding debt obligations rose to 
114% of reserves by the summer of 2002 (Arista 28). As Stiglitz argues, this 
short-term lending “exports” the risk associated with lending to the 
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borrowing country by effectively allowing for the recall (net outflows of 
capital) at the first sign of economic instability (237). Furthermore, the debt-
to-service ratio placed downward pressure on domestic currency, resulting in 
local inflation and compounding capital outflows. The 2002 presidential 
elections in Brazil and the impending Iraq war created additional uncertainty 
in currency markets. By 2002, Argentina defaulted on its massive debt and 
the Latin American currencies fell dramatically against the dollar. The 
lasting effects continue to be evident in Latin America as the resulting 
currency crisis smashed any hope of sustainable growth or reasonable 
inflation expectations (Arista 26-30). The debt service of Latin American 
countries to public credit institutions, including the World Bank, resulted in 
a disheartening 0% per capita GDP growth rate between 1997 and 2002 
(Ocampo as citied in Arista 30). There is little doubt that there can be much 
GDP growth when net capital movement is negative, as was the case when 
the Latin American MICs tried to service their dollar or euro-denominated 
debt with their relatively worthless currency.  
The case of Latin America demonstrates how most of the development 
risk was placed squarely on the shoulders of the citizens and governments in 
borrowing countries. Crisis after crisis has, and will continue, to retard 
economic growth in the region until the developed countries decide to share 
in the risk (as well as the rewards) of economic prosperity. Taken at face 
value, the premise of World Bank loans, particularly through the IBRD, look 
very promising in its endeavor to “[reduce] global poverty… and improve… 
living standards” (About Us 2007). However, policies in practice prove to be 
antithetical to the World Bank’s altruistic aim, and demonstrate the potential 
to create and prolong economic crises. 
 
Policy Concerns 
 
Since loans are denominated in dollars or euros, the main risk countries 
bear when borrowing through the World Bank is currency fluctuation. This 
currency fluctuation risk has real consequences that ultimately keep Latin 
America and other countries impoverished. Borrowers, like the Latin 
American countries in the late 1990s, are subject to a devaluation of their 
currency in relation to the currency in which the loan is to be repaid. There 
is research that indicates loans made to MICs with “good democracies” 
produce outcomes that are much more positive than the Latin America 
example above (Butkiewicz, & Yanikkaya 379). Here, capital inflows by 
way of IDA aid or a loan from the IBRD seem to correlate to GDP growth 
only in as much as the economic and monetary policies of the borrowing 
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nation-states are sound (Butkiewicz, & Yanikkaya 378-383). Governments 
having sound policies generally enjoy rule of law, open economies, stable 
“general fund” accounts, and low inflation. As such, these countries are 
presumably better able to service their debt. More importantly, the capital 
inflows are more likely to make their way to needed infrastructure, 
education, and healthcare needs. 
In recent years, the World Bank has made their loans conditional with the 
aim of promoting democratic political systems. This could have two 
counterproductive results. First, imposing external conditions on a country 
has the potential to weaken its political institutions and can impede 
democratization, as the borrowing country’s citizens may perceive its 
government as “giving into international institutions… run by the U. S.” 
(Stiglitz 12). In cases where a country’s citizens feel betrayed by their 
government, citizens and the members of government could be discouraged 
from working together to establish policies, especially economic ones, that 
enjoy widespread support. The World Bank has no real post-loan policing 
abilities in any case. As such, there is little evidence that loan policy 
conditions have any actual impact on the development outcomes themselves 
(Dollar & Stevens as cited in Bird & Rowlands 88). This means that the 
sources of power for influencing policy reforms lies not with the World 
Bank, but with the country whose monetary denomination the loan is made 
in. Currency adjustments in the General Account appear to wield greater 
influence over policy reforms in borrowing nations (Bird & Rowlands 87-
89). 
Second, as evidenced by the failure of the Washington Consensus, 
enforcing economic policies that work for developed countries prove 
disastrous for developing ones. Many developing countries thought (or were 
told) that adopting the Washington Consensus would somehow make 
themselves appear more investment or credit-worthy in world markets, thus 
attracting FDI. This was just not the case. Some research has shown that 
adoption of the loan conditions have little if any impact on FDI, and in some 
cases there is evidence to suggest that World Bank lending actually deters 
FDI (Bird, & Rowlands 98). 
Applying CST 
A survey of World Bank lending practices to Latin America over the last 
decade exposes some of the ways in which developed countries do in fact 
exploit developing countries under the auspice of “global poverty reduction” 
(About Us 2007). These words rang empty during the lost decade and in 
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2002 when the Latin American countries needed capital inflows to stabilize 
their economy. Instead, the developed countries, operating through the 
World Bank, retracted capital and let the borrowing countries default, which 
further compounded the problem. Certainly, it is reasonable to have some 
moral expectation for developed countries to cease exploiting other countries 
through the World Bank. It also seems reasonable to construct World Bank 
policies that are congruent with its mission. CST offers just such a moral 
critique by asking the question, in the economic relationships facilitated by 
the World Bank, is the common good served through an equitable 
distribution of burdens and benefits? As this essay has proven thus far, the 
answer is definitively no. 
As evidenced by lending to Latin America, the World Bank (and thereby 
its members) does not share equally in the burdens of development in the 
global economy on at least three accounts. First, in the interest of its 
developed members, the World Bank denominates loans in dollars or euros 
to protect the lenders from currency fluctuations and regional politics. 
Secondly, policies such as the Washington Consensus protect investors and 
private lenders by allowing them to withdraw their capital at the first sign of 
economic instability. Thirdly, lenders profit from short-term and cyclical 
lending that provides economic rewards in times of economic growth, but 
exposes the borrowing nation to instability and subsequent net outflows 
precisely at the time when inflows are most needed. 
In these ways, World Bank lending practices are at least partially 
predatory. That is, instead of lifting up developing countries so all member 
of the global community can enjoy the fruits of economic prosperity, these 
loans serve to suppress economic growth for those who need it most. And, 
while the dollar was affected slightly by the currency fluctuations in the 
Latin American example, the brunt of the burden is left on the borrowing 
region. The 0% GDP growth resulting from net capital outflows to service 
the dollar-denominated debt is disharmonious with CST. The idea of 
solidarity in SRS calls us to make sacrifices for the good of the global 
community (SRS 45). While there is a great responsibility for poorer nation-
states to adopt policies that give their citizenry an opportunity to partake in 
the wealth generated by trade, the wealthier nations have a moral 
responsibility to bear some of the burden of development in poorer countries 
(Galston, as cited in Gehring 3). The basic criticism leveled against 
globalization is that it excludes the participation of the majority of the global 
community (Held & McGrew, as cited in Coleman & Ryan 14). This 
principle was well understood by Thomas Aquinas, who would benchmark 
the flourishing of the few to the flourishing of the entire global community 
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(Land 65-66). The World Bank practices favor the few and privileged and 
require little or no sacrifice on the behalf of the developed nations; therefore, 
World Bank policies, when put into practice, do not produce human 
flourishing. The idea of the common good as developed through CST, 
particularly from a standpoint of distributive justice, requires more moral 
responsibility than World Bank lending practices demonstrate. 
 
CST Ideals and Good Economic Sense:  
Dollar Denominations and Interdependence 
 
In addition to using CST as a moral guidepost, ideals of the common 
good and distributive justice provide some basis for sound economic policy 
as well. Take, for instance, the example of what it might look like for the 
World Bank to lend money denominated in pesos. Stiglitz suggests that this 
“sound macro-economic policy” would reduce the borrowing countries’ risk 
because it would lead to low inflation and more consistent exchange rates 
(237). Certainly lenders would have a more vested interest in the success of 
projects funded in local currencies. If the development project enabled 
participation in the global economy, then success will be directly linked to 
repayment as well as the stability of the international monetary system. In 
this way, borrowing countries’ economic flourishing, and presumably 
general human flourishing, would truly be in the (economic) interest of all 
members of the World Bank.  
Consider the benefits of additional markets for U.S. goods and services 
or less expensive and higher quality agrarian imports. Economically, it 
makes sense for the U.S. to have a vested interest in the prosperity of all 
nations of the globe, particularly our neighbors to the south. As CST 
suggests, developed countries should “acknowledge fully their 
interdependence,” including currency exchange rates. Here the moral 
responsibility is to share the risk associated with development lending so 
that MIC might achieve sustained economic growth. If currency fluctuation 
risk in the Latin American example was more equally shared, the U.S. might 
have had more of a vested interest in helping the Latin American countries 
succeed in their attempts to achieve sustained growth. A growing economy 
to the U.S.’s south has the potential to alleviate some of the immigration 
issues the country currently faces, to create open markets for American 
exports, and to provide a steady supply of low-cost imports for consumption.  
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Long-Term Commitment 
 
Solidarity implies a long-term commitment and a vested interest in a 
relationship. CST offers guidance into how our common thread as members 
of the human race ought to guide our actions and polices. This idea of 
solidarity and sharing in burdens and benefits suggest unifying with 
members of the global community for the flourishing of all. It also makes 
sense from an economic perspective.  
Consider the lending that takes place on a short-term basis during periods 
of boom for developing countries. The World Bank and private lenders 
make these loans because they are profitable. The Bank hopes to return the 
profits to other developing countries in the way of loans or credits. The 
private lenders will report the profits in their bottom line. Even if profits 
gained through predatory lending was morally acceptable, the eventual 
default proves less than profitable in the long run. Again, consider the Latin 
American example. After defaulting on their loans, Argentina, one of the 
major borrowing countries, was only able to repay lenders a fraction of the 
original loan amount (Stiglitz 223). Had the World Bank structured the loans 
in a way that promoted a long-term commitment to the region, the resulting 
sustained growth would have been profitable for all involved. For the World 
Bank, it also would have been a demonstration of its members’ commitment 
to its mission. 
 
Short-Term Cyclical Lending 
 
It seems particularly obvious that solidarity in the international 
community would require that help be provided in a time of need. 
Unfortunately, the global economic system and the lending practices of the 
World Bank run seemingly counterintuitive. The conditionality of World 
Bank loan terms oftentimes requires borrowing countries to liberalize their 
markets so that capital can easily flow in and out of the country. These 
supposed economic integration policies (e.g., the Washington Consensus), 
which provide lenders the right to pull their capital at the first sign of 
economic instability, result in what amounts to a flight of capital at the 
precise time when capital is needed. The resulting instability in exchange 
rates, inflation, and the economic loss to the lending institutions endangers 
the global economic system (Wolf 32, 61). Instead, the World Bank should 
lend counter-cyclically, not only because it would provide resources to 
people in desperate need, but because it is sound economic policy that will 
perpetuate stability in the global economy (Stiglitz 236). 
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The idea of shared burdens and benefits for the pursuit of the common 
good suggest that it is the lenders, rather than the borrowing nations, who 
need policy reform.  As Stiglitz argues, oftentimes default is not the result of 
poor economic policies in borrowing countries, but rather a failure of 
markets to share in the risk (231-244). Though not based in economic 
theory, CST offers relevant guidance on moral responsibilities in the 
economic sphere. These moral responsibilities are both market friendly and 
congruent with sound economic policy. It seems easy for members of the 
World Bank from developed nations to point the finger outward and not take 
responsibility for all the human suffering that exists. However, policies in 
practice matter. The reality is that the World Bank and its wealthy nation 
members have more power than they care to exercise.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the globalization debate is often marked by contention 
over how globalization impacts the global community. There is much 
evidence to suggest that countries that participate in globalization, on the 
whole, enjoy increased GDP rates per capita, more primary education, and 
more rule of law then their less globalized counterparts. There is little 
doubt that globalization and the free market system have enormous 
potential to relieve human suffering and universally raise the global 
standard of living. However, those critical of globalization argue that in the 
current power structure, developed countries repress and exploit countries 
in order to preserve their position at the top. These critics are not 
necessarily anti-globalization, but they are certainly anti-human suffering 
at the hands of wealthy nation-states. 
Taking Latin America as an example, this essay has argued that one 
starting place to evaluate the phenomena of globalization is to look at 
World Bank lending practices. Developed nations set the agenda and 
polices of the World Bank and thus the development scheme in the global 
economy. By crafting policies, trade agreements, and loan terms that are 
favorable to them, members of the World Bank from developed countries 
do not meet reasonable moral standards suggested by CST. 
CST offers moral guidance grounded in centuries of experience of the 
Catholic Church in human development. The basic theme in CST is the 
idea of the common good. Since the World Bank is chartered for the 
purpose of the common global good, CST seems particularly relevant for a 
moral analysis. Using some historical roots of CST and more recent papal 
encyclicals, we see that the idea of equal distributions of burdens and 
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benefits associated with being members of the global community is 
morally binding. Advancing this idea of moral responsibility, solidarity 
calls upon nations to acknowledge their interdependence and to make 
sacrifices for the common good. Having CST as a frame of reference, one 
can ask the question—how do World Bank lending practices stand up? 
The World Bank is made up of five institutions and in recent years has 
claimed to serve the purpose of “global poverty reduction and 
improve[ing] living standards” (About Us 2007). Its activities on the world 
markets, designed to raise funds for MICs, give the Bank the capital it 
needs to make loans with favorable terms to countries that otherwise would 
not receive enough FDI to sustain development. However, in practice, 
lending terms favor the developed nations more than the developing ones. 
As was the case with the Latin American example, the World Bank forces 
policies like the Washington Consensus upon poorer countries, which 
exposes them to volatility that their fledgling economies cannot handle. 
Additionally, loans denominated in dollars and euros expose the borrowing 
regions to major currency fluctuation risk. These lending practices 
oftentimes result in developed countries and their banks extracting their 
capital unharmed while the borrowing countries are left to default on their 
debt, or worse use large percentages of the their GDP to service loans. This 
is often money that could be used to invest in infrastructure, education, 
health, and other public goods needed for development. 
Applying the basic principle of the common good taught by CST to this 
case analysis suggests that World Bank lending practices are immoral. 
Developed countries have a responsibility to share equally in the burdens 
of development lending. On all accounts discussed in this essay, developed 
countries do not share in any of the burdens because they do not share any 
of the risk. Denominating loans in dollars, lending for the short-term, and 
withdrawing capital in times of crisis, leaves many poorer nations left to 
suffer. CST’s morality is not so pious as to be unattainable. Rather, the 
moral responsibility that CST proposes is also grounded in sound 
economic policy. Sharing risk has the potential to create sustainable 
growth for the world’s population. This, in turn, will create more public 
goods, more consumable goods, and more markets for exports. Most 
importantly, it would fulfill the wealthy nations’ moral obligation to the 
global community by providing the poorer nations with an opportunity to 
share in the benefits of globalization. 
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